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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
David J. Arthur appeals from the district court's orders revoking Arthur's 
probation and denying his subsequently filed Rule 35 motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On September 18, 2008, police arrested Arthur on suspicion of driving under the 
influence. (R., pp.9-10.) As this was Arthur's third driving under the influence, with prior 
convictions in 2001 and 2007, respectively, the State charged Arthur with felony driving 
under the influence. (R., pp.28-31.) Arthur and prosecutors negotiated a binding Rule 
11 plea agreement in which Arthur would be placed "on supervised probation for a 
period of four years," in exchange for Arthur's pleading guilty, completing various 
evaluations and treatment programs, and serving 100 days in jail. (R., pp.49-51.) As 
part of his plea agreement, Arthur also "expressly waive[d] any appeals that may 
lawfully be waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 and any appeal of Post Conviction Relief." (Id.) 
Before sentencing, the district court expressed some concerns with the plea 
agreement, and told the parties what amendments were necessary before the court 
would accept the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, including 360 total days of jail time. 
(5/28/2009 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-23; p.5, Ls.10-21.) The parties accepted the district court's 
modifications and requested that the district court follow the Rule 11 plea agreement as 
amended. (5/28/2009 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.5.) Consistent with the parties' binding 
plea agreement, the district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Arthur 
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to a unified term of ten years with five years fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed 
Arthur on four years of supervised probation. (R., pp.61-71.) 
On June 25, 2010, Arthur was charged with violating his probation by consuming 
alcohol and changing his residence without first receiving his probation officer's 
permission. (R., pp.76-81.} In exchange for Arthur's admitting the charge of consuming 
alcohol, the State dismissed the charge for changing his residence, and the parties 
recommended that Arthur be continued on probation with the additional condition that 
he participate in the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program. (7/23/2010 Tr., 
p.2, Ls.6-13; p.4, L.5 - p.5, L.3; 8/30/2010 Tr., p.19, L.2 - p.20, L.13.} Consistent with 
the parties' agreement, the district court reinstated Arthur on probation with the new 
condition that he successfully participate and complete the New Life Program. (R., 
p.93.) The district court also made clear that this was Arthur's last chance to succeed 
on probation. (8/30/2010 Tr., p.25, L.1 - p.26, L.2.) 
Three weeks later, Arthur again violated his probation agreement when he was 
terminated from the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program and received a 
related charge. (R., pp.100-06.) Pursuant to another agreement, Arthur admitted the 
termination, the State dismissed the related charge, and the parties requested a Rider. 
(10/13/2010 Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, L.5; p.6, L. 5 - p.7, L.18; 11/22/2010 Tr., p.29, Ls.17-
24; p.36, Ls.10-13.) This time, however, the district court rejected the parties' 
recommendation, noting that Arthur had already received a Rider and finding that 
probation was not achieving the goal of rehabilitation. (11/22/2010 Tr., p.38, L.17 -
p.42, L.2.) The district court revoked Arthur's probation. (R., pp.120-21.) 
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Arthur filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his underlying sentence. (R., 
pp.115-19.) The district court denied Arthur's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.129-31.) Arthur 
filed an appeal timely from the revocation of probation. (R., pp.122-24.) 
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ISSUES 
Arthur states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from the district court's disposition 
of his probation revocation proceedings and subsequent timely filed Rule 
35 motion waived by Mr. Arthur's original plea agreement? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Arthur's probation without first considering whether this violation was 
willful and whether alternative means would be adequate to address the 
violation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Arthur's 
timely Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence following the 
revocation of his probation because the district court failed to recognize its 
discretion to entertain the merits of this motion? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Does Arthur's negotiated, binding Rule 11 plea agreement unambiguously waive 
all lawfully waivable appeals and expressly waive "any appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35," thus barring the appeal of Arthur's probation revocation and 
subsequently filed Rule 35 motion? 
2. If Arthur is not barred from appealing the probation revocation, has Arthur failed 
to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in revoking probation? 
3. If Arthur is not barred from appealing the denial of his Rule 35 motion, has Arthur 
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in denying that motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Arthur's Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement Unambiguously Waived All Appellate Rights 
That Were Lawfully Waivable, Including An Appeal From His Probation's Revocation 
And Especially From The Denial Of A Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Arthur contends that "the prospective waiver of his appellate rights" in the original 
plea agreement "did not encompass a right to appeal from subsequent probation 
revocation proceedings," asserting that the agreement is ambiguous. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-8.) Arthur's argument fails because the term of the plea agreement is an 
unambiguous prospective waiver of all appellate rights that "expressly waives any 
appeals that may lawfully be waived." (R., p.51.) Arthur's appeal should therefore be 
dismissed as non-justiciable and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
Even if an ambiguity could be read into the plea agreement's term prospectively waiving 
all appellate rights, there is certainly no ambiguity as far as that waiver relates to an 
appeal pursuant to a Rule 35 motion; Arthur's appeal as it relates to that issue should 
therefore be dismissed and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Interpretation of a plea agreement is governed by contract law standards. State 
v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995); State v. Holdaway. 130 Idaho 482, 
484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law reviewed de nova. State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782, 785, 918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct. 
App. 1996). The interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea 
agreement are matters of law reviewed de nova. State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 234, 
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985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999). However, the interpretation of ambiguous language in an 
agreement presents a question of fact. !sL "Such interpretations require a trier of fact to 
discern the intent of the contracting parties, generally by considering the objective and 
purpose of the provision and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the 
agreement." State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006). 
C. The Negotiated Plea Agreement Unambiguously Waived All Prospective 
Appellate Rights That Could Lawfully Be Waived 
On March 17, 2009, Arthur and prosecutors negotiated a binding Rule 11 plea 
agreement. One of the terms of that binding plea agreement was as follows: 
As part of the plea agreement, Defendant hereby expressly waives any 
appeals that may lawfully be waived, including, but not limited to, any 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and any appeal for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
(R., p.51.) That term of the plea agreement provided an unambiguous waiver of all of 
Arthur's lawfully waivable prospective appellate rights. Arthur therefore has no right to 
appeal from the district court's revocation of probation and this issue is not justiciable. 
Arthur's appeal should be dismissed in its entirety and the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
Even if the plea agreement's term waiving all prospective appeals could be 
construed as ambiguous regarding the revocation of probation, it is certainly 
unambiguous in its prospective waiver of any appeals arising from a Rule 35 motion. 
On its face, the term explicitly waives "any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35." 
(R., p.51.) Arthur has therefore waived his right to appeal from the district court's denial 
of his Rule 35 motion. Even if Arthur's appeal is not dismissed in its entirety, it should 
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be as it pertains to that issue, because Arthur has shown no ambiguity in the waiver of 
any appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
11. 
Even If Arthur Could Appeal From His Probation's Revocation, Arthur Has Still Failed To 
Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Revoking Probation 
A Introduction 
Despite unambiguously waiving all prospective appellate rights "that may lawfully 
be waived" (R., p.51 ), Arthur nonetheless appeals from the revocation of his probation, 
asserting that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and 
executed his previously imposed sentence of ten years with five years fixed, after Arthur 
failed to comply with the terms and conditions of his probation multiple times. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.) Even if Arthur could appeal from his probation's revocation, 
Arthur has still failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P .3d 33, 36 (2009) ( citing State v. Lafferty, 125 
Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
C. The District Court Correctly Revoked Arthur's Probation 
In reviewing a district court's decision to revoke probation, this Court employs a 
two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted). First, 
the Court considers whether the defendant actually violated his probation. ~ "If it is 
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determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second 
question is what should be the consequences of that violation." & A district court's 
decision to revoke probation is a discretionary one that will not be overturned on appeal 
absent an abuse of that discretion. & None of Arthur's arguments establish an abuse 
of the district court's discretion in this case. 
Arthur was not a model probationer. Arthur was placed on probation on June 9, 
2009. (R., pp.61-63.) Consistent with his binding plea agreement, Arthur was ordered 
to serve 360 days in jail. (R., p.60.) At least 180 of those days were served in custody, 
with the remaining days requiring consistent monitoring through the Day Reporting 
Program for at least 90 days and then the work-release program. (Id.) Within a few 
weeks of completing that heavily supervised portion of his probation, Arthur violated his 
probation by consuming alcohol on June 18, and June 20, 2010, and by changing his 
residence without getting written permission from his probation officer. (R., pp.78-80.) 
The two violations were related. Arthur began his probation living with his mother 
and sister. (R., p.79.) Their landlord, after discovering Arthur's sex offender registration 
requirements, ordered him to move out. (Id.) Arthur moved in with his aunt. (Id.) 
However, when Arthur came home drunk on June 18, 2010, his aunt kicked him out of 
her house. (Id.) So, with nowhere else to go, Arthur moved back in with his mother. 
(Id.) But Arthur could not stay with his mother, because the landlord would evict his 
mother and sister. (Id.) 
Needing a place to stay to remain on probation, and on the recommendation of 
his probation officer, Arthur decided to look into the Lighthouse Rescue Mission. 
(8/30/2010 Tr., p.22, Ls.17-24.) At the first probation revocation hearing, after Arthur 
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had admitted the first violation and the State had dismissed the second, the parties 
jointly recommended that Arthur be reinstated on probation, with the new condition that 
he complete the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program with no additional 
violations. (8/30/2010 Tr., p.19, L.2 - p.20, L.4.) 
The district court accepted the parties' recommendation and gave Arthur another 
chance to succeed on probation, reinstating him with that new condition. (8/30/2010 
Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9.) In doing so, it also issued a strong warning, stating: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Arthur, I'm going to make you a deal. I'm 
going to go ahead and find that you violated probation, give you credit for 
seventy days that you served, place you back out on probation with the 
requirement that you live at the Lighthouse, complete their programs, not 
change residence obviously without permission of your P.O. All of the 
other terms and conditions will be in effect. When you come back in here, 
don't ask me again, because you're gone. You got it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Do you recall all the terms and conditions of your 
probation? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And what's going to happen if you violate? 
THE DEFENDANT: I will go to prison. 
THE COURT: And do you remember your sentence? 
THE DEFENDANT: Five years fixed. 
THE COURT: Plus five. Okay ... 
(8/30/2010 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-21.) Within three weeks of being placed at the Lighthouse 
Rescue Mission, Arthur violated his probation again by getting terminated from the New 
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Life Program on September 21, 2010. (R., p.102; 10/13/2010 Tr., p.6, Ls.5-14; p.8, 
Ls.3-4.) As promised, the district court revoked Arthur's probation and imposed his 
original sentence. (11/22/2010 Tr., p.41, L.7 - p.42, L.9.) 
Arthur does not dispute that he was terminated from the New Life Program and 
so violated that condition of his probation. Rather, Arthur argues that his several 
violations of the New Life Program's rules were not willful, and so the district court's 
revocation of his probation was inappropriate. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.) The 
repeated rule violations which eventually led to Arthur's termination from the New Life 
Program included verbally intimidating other program members, violating the blackout 
policy by trying to call his ex-girlfriend both from the mission and from Terry Reilly 
Health Services, voicing objections to the religious aspects of the program, and 
passively refusing to take a drug test by not urinating in the sample cup. (R., p.102.) All 
of these actions were within Arthur's control. 
Arthur asserts that he failed to produce a urine sample for testing because he 
suffers from a shy bladder, making it difficult for him to give a urine sample on demand. 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) This argument ignores the fact that Arthur was given his 
sample cup at 5:30 am. (R., p.103.) By noon, he had still failed to place a urine sample 
in his cup for testing. (Id.) However, Arthur admitted to his probation officer that he had 
urinated multiple times that morning. (Id.) Even if Arthur's allegedly "shy bladder" 
makes it difficult for him to urinate on command, that hardly excuses his failure to place 
a sample in the cup when he is already urinating. (Id.) As his case manager at the 
rescue mission noted, "[s]ince [Arthur] admitted to using the bathroom several times 
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during the morning without having taken his UA, it clearly indicates a refusal to test on 
his part, and not simply any problem with not being able to urinate." (Id.) 
Arthur also contends that his violations for "verbally intimidating other program 
members" and "voicing objections to the religious aspects of the program" (R., p.103) 
stemmed from his "standing up for his ethnic and religious heritage," and were not willful 
violations. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) Assuming that these two violations are interrelated 
as Arthur suggests, they do not show a lack of willful conduct on his part. Arthur asked 
to be placed in the New Life Program because of its religious aspects, not in spite of 
them. (See 8/30/2010 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-8; p.24, Ls.22-25.) And, while "standing up" for 
one's heritage may be commendable, verbally intimidating others is not. 
On appeal, Arthur does not address his violations of his "blackout period" by at 
least twice attempting to call his ex-girlfriend. Below, Arthur argued that he had 
permission to call his mother, and so that was not a violation of the New Life Program's 
rules. (11/22/2010 Tr., p.37, Ls.13-22.) Even assuming Arthur had permission to call 
his mother, his argument still failed to recognize that he was not violated for calling his 
mother; he was violated for attempting to call his ex-girlfriend. (R., p.102.) Again, 
Arthur had control over whether or not he attempted to call his ex-girlfriend. 
Arthur's probation was revoked because, in violation of that probation, he was 
terminated from the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program. (11/22/2010 Tr., 
p.41, Ls.7-12.) Arthur was terminated from the New Life Program because of his 
repeated offenses and rules violations, which included verbally intimidating other 
program members, calling his ex-girlfriend during his blackout period, voicing objections 
to the religious aspects of the program, and refusing to give a urine sample. (R., 
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pp.102-03.) None of these actions were beyond Arthur's control. Arthur has failed to 
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in revoking his probation. The 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
111. 
Even If Arthur Could Appeal From The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion, Arthur Has Still 
Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In Denying The Motion 
Despite unambiguously waiving "any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35" 
(R., p.51), Arthur nonetheless appeals from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, asserting 
that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion (appellant's brief, 
pp.12-15). Even if Arthur could appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 motion, he has still 
failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, the district "court may ... reduce a sentence upon 
revocation of probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of 
the order revoking probation." I.C.R. 35(b). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards 
governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 
P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). Where a sentence is legal, those standards require an 
appellant to "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Arthur failed to satisfy 
this burden. 
Arthur failed to provide any new or additional information to the district court in 
support of his Rule 35 motion. Quite to the contrary, through his counsel in his request 
for leniency, Arthur asked that the "Honorable Court further consider the information 
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provided at Sentencing and contained in the Pre Sentence [sic] Investigation to 
reconsider the sentence originally imposed." (R., pp.115-16.) Arthur also filed a direct 
request for leniency, arguing again that his "shy bladder is a real condition" and that his 
mother and sister were ill. (R., p.118.) The district court was already familiar with the 
presentence report, was present at sentencing, and had heard Arthur's arguments 
regarding his shy bladder and ill family members at the probation revocation hearing. 
None of that information was new. 
When considering a sentence imposed through a binding Rule 11 agreement, a 
Rule 35 motion is frivolous if the defendant fails to show that his sentence is excessive 
in view of additional information presented with the motion for reduction. See State v. 
Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 526, 873 P.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App. 1994). Absent the presentation 
of new or additional information, Arthur has failed to establish an abuse of the district 
court's discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion. The district court correctly denied 
Arthur's Rule 35 motion and its sentence should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking Arthur's probation, and the district court's subsequent order denying Arthur's 
Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2011. 
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